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Choice, Chance, and Wealth
Dispersion at Retirement
Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
Whyd osomeh ouseholds have substantial wealth at retirement while oth-
ers have very little? Indeed, why do some households with given lifetime
earnings have substantial wealth at retirement, while other households
with the same lifetime earnings accumulate very little wealth? In an earlier
paper(Ventia nd Wise 1999), we evaluated the extent to which the diﬀerent
wealth accumulation of households with similar lifetime earnings could be
accounted for by random shocks, such as health status and inheritances,
that could reduce or increase the available resources out of which saving
could be drawn. We concluded that only a small fraction of the dispersion
in wealth accumulation within lifetime earnings deciles could be ac-
counted for by random shocks and thus that most of the dispersion could
be attributed to choice; some people save while young, others do not. We
continue that analysis in this paper but with two additions: First, we at-
tempt to evaluate the eﬀecto fi nvestment choice on the accumulation of
assets—in particular, how much of the dispersion in wealth can be ac-
counted for by the choice between investment in the stock market and
investment in presumably less risky assets such as bonds or bank saving
accounts. Second, we attempt to understand the relationship between asset
accumulation and individuals’ assessment, just prior to retirement, of the
adequacy of their saving and their saving behavior. This very exploratory
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25analysis is an attempt to evaluate the usefulness of an experimental saving
module administered to a subsample of Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) respondents.
People, ofc o urse, accumulate diﬀerent amounts of wealth in part be-
cause they have diﬀerent earnings. We essentially set that dispersion aside
by considering persons with similar lifetime earnings. Thus the discussion
here is about the dispersion of asset accumulation among persons with the
same lifetime earnings. Given lifetime earnings, we consider the impor-
tance of “chance” events versus the choice to save in determining asset
accumulation. Over the course of a lifetime many events not directly under
the control of the household may aﬀect the accumulation of wealth. We
refer to these as chance events. They may include both unfavorable shocks,
such as health care costs, and positive shocks, such as inheritances.
We distinguish between such chance events, which aﬀect the resources
from which saving could be drawn, and the choice of how much tos a v eo f
the resources that are available. In fact, we consider two components of
saving choice: One is the choice to save or not to save; the other is saving
mode or investment choice. Households with similar lifetime resources
may investi nd i ﬀerent assets that earn diﬀerent rates of return. We might
think of three groups: nonsavers, savers who invest conservatively and
have low rates of return, and savers who invest in more risky assets and
have higher rates of return. Persons who invest in bonds or bank savings
accounts will have lower rates of return on average than those who invest
in stocks.
Whether accumulated wealth is attributable to the choice to save rather
than to chance can have signiﬁcant implications for government policy.
Many policies impose ex post taxes on accumulated assets. For example,
elderly Americans who saved when young and thus have higher capital
incomes when old pay higher taxes on Social Security beneﬁts. Shoven
and Wise (1997, 1998) show that those who save too much in pension
plans in particular face very large “success” tax penalties when pension
beneﬁts are withdrawn. In addition, pension assets left as a bequest can be
virtually conﬁscated through the tax system. The spend-down Medicaid
provision is another example. The belief—perhaps unstated—that chance
events determine the dispersion in wealth may weigh in favor of such taxes
in the legislative voting that imposes them.
If, on the other hand, the dispersion of wealth among the elderly reﬂects
conscious lifetime spending-versus-saving decisions—rather than diﬀer-
encesi nlifetime resources—these higher taxes may be harder to justify
and appear to penalize savers who spend less when they are young. From
an economic perspective, if wealth accumulation is random, taxing saving
has no incentive eﬀects. On the other hand, if wealth accumulation results
from conscious decisions to save versus spend, penalizing savers may have
substantial incentive eﬀects, discouraging individuals from saving for their
ownr etirement and limiting aggregate economic growth. It is important
26 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wiseto understand that this paper is about the dispersion in the accumulation
of assets of persons with similar lifetime earnings. The issue raised here is
nota bout progressive taxation, but rather about diﬀerences in taxes im-
posed on persons who spend tomorrow versus today, given the same after-
tax lifetime earnings.
The same issue arises with respect to return on investments. In this case,
higher expected returns come at the expense of more risk when young, just
as higher saving rates come at the expense of lower consumption when
young. And, just as it may be harder to justify imposing higher taxes on
older households who choose to consume less and save more while young,
it may also be harder to justify imposing higher taxes on older households
for assuming greater risk while young. In addition, of course, the higher
taxes may discourage saving and limit economic growth. Again, the ques-
tion raised here is not about progressive taxation; it is about the diﬀerent
taxing of persons who assume risk while young versus those who do not,
given the same lifetime earnings.
We begin this paper by controlling for lifetime earnings as reported in
individual Social Security records. Given lifetime earnings, we examine the
distribution of wealth, ﬁnding a very wide dispersion in the distribution of
accumulateds a ving, evena mong families with the lowest lifetime earnings.
We then show that only a small fraction of the dispersion can be explained
by individual circumstances that may have limited the ability to save out
of earnings. For persons in the same lifetime earnings decile, we do this by
comparing the unconditional dispersion in wealth at retirement with the
dispersion after controlling for chance events that may have aﬀected life-
time resources out of which saving could have been drawn. Then we at-
tempt to determine how much of the dispersion might be attributed to in-
vestment choices. Here we are limited by available data, having to rely on
the allocation of assets at the time of the HRS.
We conclude that the bulk of the dispersion in wealth at retirement re-
sults from the choice of some families to save while other similarly situated
families choose to spend. For the most part, controlling for lifetime earn-
ings, persons with little saving on the eve of retirement have simply chosen
to save less and spend more over their lifetimes. It is particularly striking
that some households with very low lifetime resources accumulate a great
deal of wealth, and some households with very high lifetime resources
accumulate little wealth. We ﬁnd these saving disparities cannot be ac-
counted for by adverse ﬁnancial events, such as poor health, or by inheri-
tances. While better control for individual circumstances that may limit
resources could change somewhat the magnitudes that we obtain, we be-
lieve that the general thrust of the conclusions would not change.1
1. It may be useful to view our estimates in the context of the broader literature on saving
and consumption. Our focus is on the dispersion in saving among households with similar
lifetime resources. The idea is to isolate empirically the portion of the saving variance attrib-
utable to individual choice (or “tastes”) once diﬀerences in lifetime earnings are accounted
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lies in our sample had followed speciﬁc saving plans throughout their
working lives. This exercise shows that even families with modest lifetime
earnings would have accumulated substantial wealth had they saved con-
sistently and invested prudently over the course of their working lives.
Finally, we consider how asset accumulation, again controlling for life-
time earnings, is related to individual attitudes about saving and saving ad-
equacy.
1.1 The Data
The analysis is based on household data collected in the baseline inter-
view of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).2 The household heads
were aged ﬁfty-one to sixty-one in 1992 when the baseline survey was con-
ducted. The analysis relies on the wealth of households at the time of the
survey and on lifetime earnings, which is measured by historical earnings
reported to the Social Security Administration.3 The Social Security earn-
ings data are available for 8,257 of the 12,652 HRS respondents. Compari-
son ofr e s p o n d e n t sf o rw h o mw ed oa n ddo not have Social Security rec-
ords suggests that they are very similar. Selected characteristics of the two
groups are shown in table 1.1. The groups have almost the same household
income, the same average age, and the same years of education; the same
proportion are married; and almost the same proportion are female. A
slightly larger proportion of those for whom we have Social Security rec-
ords are HRS primary respondents (64 percent versus 60 percent).
Our analysis is based on household rather than individual respondent
data, however. Historical earnings for a single-person household required
only that Social Security earnings records be available for that person. But
forat w o-person household, it was necessary to have historical earnings
forb othp ersonsi nthe household if both had been in the labor force for a
signiﬁcant length of time. The HRS obtained such data for 1,625 single-
for. In most standard consumption models, dispersion in saving arises primarily from diﬀer-
encesi nh ousehold incomes. Such models do not aim to explain the variation in wealth
among families with the same lifetime incomes. Some authors, such as Attanasio et al. (1995)
and Venti and Wise (1990) allow saving choices to depend on household characteristics, like
education and marital status. Another way to account for taste variation is to estimate a
distribution of rates of time preference that ﬁts the variation in saving, given income. This
approach has been adopted by Samwick (1996). This approach equates taste and time prefer-
ence butd oes not aim to distinguish choice (taste) from chance. Still another—and quite
diﬀerent—explanation for saving variation among households with similar resources is pro-
vided by behavioral models in which households diﬀer in the level of discipline or self-control
required to commit to a saving plan, as proposed by Shefrin and Thaler (1988). The aim is
to explain why households make diﬀerent choices, but, again, not to isolate the eﬀects of
choice versus chance events.
2. This section and the data appendix are largely reproduced from our earlier paper (Venti
and Wise 1999). Some components of later sections also rely heavily on that paper.
3. See Juster and Suzman (1995) for a discussion of the structure and content of the HRS.
Mitchell, Olson, and Steinmeier (2000) describe the attached Social Security earnings ﬁle.
28 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wiseperson households and for 2,751 two-person households, together com-
prising 4,376 of the 7,607 HRS households. Two additional sample adjust-
ments were made. First, we retained households in which one or both
members reported never having worked, even if the household member
was missing a Social Security earnings record. We assumed zero earnings
fors uchp ersons. Second, we excluded from the sample all households
that included any member who had zero social security earnings and who
reported working for any level of government for ﬁve (not necessarily con-
secutive) years. This latter restriction is intended to exclude households
that have zero Social Security earnings due to gaps in coverage. The ﬁnal
sample includes 3,992 households.4
Theo ther important data component is wealth at the time of the survey.
We need a complete accounting of assets, including personal retirement
assets such as IRAs and 401(k) balances, other personal ﬁnancial assets,
employer-provided pension assets, home equity, and assets such as real
estate and business equity. In most instances the value of each asset is
reported directly. For non-pension assets, the HRS survey reduces nonre-
sponse considerably by adopting bracketing techniques for important
wealth questions.5
In other cases asset values are not easily determined. The most impor-
tant asset that is not directly reported is the value of beneﬁts promised
under employer-provided deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans. For persons who
arer etired andr eceiving beneﬁts, this value can be approximated by using
life tables to determine the expected value of the future stream of beneﬁts.
But for nonretired persons covered by a deﬁned beneﬁt plan—and for
whom the beneﬁt is not known—the value of future beneﬁts can be only
imprecisely imputed. The imputation process relies on the respondent de-
Table 1.1 Comparison of Social Security Data for Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) Respondents
Persons without Persons with
Characteristic Social Security Records Social Security Records
Mean household income $54,252.64 $53,434.20
Percent female 53.00 54.00
Mean age 55.57 55.40
Percent nonwhite 15.00 13.00
Mean years of education 12.37 12.40
Percent married 76.00 76.00
Percent primary respondent 60.00 64.00
Source: Weighted estimates from the HRS Wave I.
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4. The present value of Social Security beneﬁts is unavailable for an additional 167 house-
holds,a nd these have been excluded in preparing tables 1.3 and 1.4, leaving a sample of
3,825. Thus the sample is slightly smaller than was used in similar tables in Venti and Wise
(1999).
5. Juster and Smith (1999) and Smith (1995) provide details.scription of pension provisions and is described in detail in the appendix.
The HRS also surveyed employers about the features of respondent pen-
sions, but those data are not used in this analysis.
1.2 Lifetime Earnings and the Wealth of Households
Social Security earnings form a good measure of lifetime labor earnings
forpersons whose earnings are consistently below the Social Security earn-
ings maximum and who have been in jobs covered by the Social Security
system. Historically, the Social Security earnings maximum has been ad-
justed on an ad hoc basis. The percentage of HRS respondents exceeding
the maximum was at its highest in the early 1970s, peaking at 26.9 percent
in 1971. The percentage has been below 10 percent since 1981 and was 4.8
percent in 1991.
Forpersons with incomes above the limit, reported Social Security earn-
ings can signiﬁcantly underestimate actual earnings. (In addition, as ex-
plained above, some persons may report zero Social Security covered earn-
ings because they were employed in sectors not covered by the Social
Security system, and we have excluded certain government employees
from the sample.) Thus we do not rely directly on Social Security earnings
to establish the level of lifetime earnings, but use reported Social Security
earnings to rank families by lifetime earnings. Then we group families into
Social Security earnings deciles, to which we refer hereafter as lifetime
earnings deciles. We believe that the ranking by Social Security earnings
represents a good approximation to a ranking based on actual total earn-
ings, and that thus the deciles are a good approximation to actual lifetime
earnings deciles. However, the problems caused by the earnings maximum
and by zeros may make results based on the lowest and highest deciles less
reliable than results based on the other deciles.
Them eanp r esent value of lifetime Social Security earnings within each
decile is shown in table 1.2. To obtain lifetime Social Security income, the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) was used to convert past earnings to 1992
dollars. The means range from about $36,000 in the lowest decile to just
over $1,600,000 in the highest decile. Within the deciles the medians are
essentially the same as the means.
Them e dians of assets, including Social Security wealth, are shown in
table 1.3. For single persons Social Security wealth is the mortality-
adjusted present value of beneﬁts. For two-person families it is the sum of
the mortality-adjusted present value of beneﬁts calculated separately for
each person. We have made no additional adjustments for joint mortality
or survivorship beneﬁts. Excluding Social Security, the median of total
wealth ranges from $5,000 for families in the lowest lifetime earnings dec-
ile to almost $388,000 for families in the top lifetime earnings decile. In-
cluding Social Security wealth, the median ranges from $33,006 in the
lowest decile to $577,107 in the top decile. Many assets are held by fewer
30 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wisethan half of the households—indicated by zero medians. The 5th and 6th
income deciles span the median of lifetime earnings, and the medians of
total wealth in these earnings deciles are $105,166 and $144,188, respec-
tively,e x cluding Social Security. Fewer than half of the families in these
deciles have IRA or 401(k) accounts. Fewer than half have business equity
or real estate. And the value of other assets is low. The median of
employer-provided pension assets (excluding 401[k] accounts) is $4,000 for
the 5th and $14,035 for the 6th lifetime income decile, not much higher
than the median values of vehicles—$6,000 and $8,000 respectively. The
median levels of ﬁnancial assets are only $3,000 and $7,000 respectively.
Thel argest component of the wealth of these families is home equity; the
medians are $29,000 and $39,000, respectively.
Them e ans of assets by lifetime earnings decile are shown in table 1.4.
Comparison of the means and medians foretells the wide dispersion in as-
sets,evena mong families with similar lifetime earnings. The means are typ-
ically much higher than the medians, and in some lifetime earnings dec-
iles the mean of ﬁnancial assets is more than ten times as large as the
median.
1.3 The Distribution of Wealth for Given Lifetime Earnings
We discuss ﬁrst the distribution of wealth within lifetime earnings dec-
iles. We then consider how much of the dispersion can be accounted for
investment choice and by chance shocks to resources. Personal chance
events—like health status or children—that might be expected to limit the
resources out of which saving might be drawn. Investment choice—e.g.,
between stocks and bonds—that may be expected to aﬀect the accumula-
tion of assets given saving out of available resources. To the extent that
chance events and investment choices are correlated, however, there is of
Choice, Chance, and Wealth Dispersion at Retirement 31
Table 1.2 Present Value of Social Security Earnings by Lifetime Earnings Decile
Lifetime Present







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.course no way to parcel out a separate eﬀectf or each of these factors. Thus
we proceed in a way that indicates the maximum portion of dispersion
that could be attributed to each.
1.3.1 Dispersion in Asset Accumulation Given
the Same Lifetime Earnings
The dispersion in total accumulated wealth by lifetime earnings decile
is shown in ﬁgure 1.1. For each earnings decile, the ﬁgure shows ﬁve quan-
tiles: the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th. The median is the 50th quantile.
Tenp ercent of families have wealth below the 10th quantile, 30 percent
have wealth below the 30th quantile, and so forth. Several features of the
data stand out. Perhaps not surprising, a noticeable proportion of house-
holds in the lowest lifetime earnings deciles have accumulated almost no
wealth by the time they have attained ages ﬁfty-one to sixty-one. Half of
those in the lowest earnings decile have less the $5,000 in wealth, as do 30
percent of those in the 2nd decile, 20 percent of those in the 3rd, and 10
percent of households in the 4th earnings decile. But even among house-
holds with the highest lifetime earnings, some households have very lim-
ited wealth. For example, 10 percent of households in the 6th earnings
decile have less than $30,000 in assets, and 10 percent of those in the 9th
earnings decile have less than $100,000.
To address the principle question of this paper, it is the dispersion of
wealth that is the most critical, and here the data are striking. Even con-
trollingforlifetimeearnings,therangeofwealthisenormous.Inthe5thlife-
timeearningsdecile,the90thquantileisthirty-ﬁvetimesthesizeofthe10th
quantile. The range is less extreme in higher earnings deciles but still very
wide: the 90th quantile is 16, 19, 12, 10, and 9 times as large as the 10th
quantile in the 6th through the 10th lifetime income deciles, respectively.
While many families with low lifetime earnings have very limited
wealth—as do some who earned the most—the wide dispersion in accu-
mulated wealth is evident among those with low and high lifetime earnings
alike. Thus some families with the lowest lifetime earnings have accumu-
lated noticeable wealth. For example, the 90th quantile is approximately
$150,000 for the lowest decile and is well above $200,000 for the 2nd and
3rd deciles.
The dispersion at the highest levels of wealth accumulation is itself sub-
stantial and is presented separatelyi nﬁ gure 1.2, which shows the 90th,
95th, and 98th quantiles by lifetime earnings decile. The 98th quantile is
typically two and a half to three times the size of the 90th quantile. Overall
there is enormous variation in wealth accumulation among households
whosem embers had similar earnings over their lifetimes. The wide varia-
tion in wealth will not be new to many readers; not so widely appreciated
is the vast variation in wealth among households with similar lifetime
earnings.
34 Steven F. Venti and David A. WiseFig. 1.1 Wealth quantiles: total wealth
Fig. 1.2 Top wealth quantiles: total wealthFigure 1.3 shows the dispersion of personal ﬁnancial assets (excluding
personal retirement assets such as IRA and 401[k] accounts). That most
people don’t save much is not new. That many of those with high earnings
save so little is, however, striking. The 10th quantile is negative or close to
zero for every lifetime earnings decile! The same is true for the 20th quan-
tile,w ith the exception of the highest earnings decile, for which the 20th
quantile is a paltry $6,400. The medians range from zero for the lowest
three deciles, to $3,000 and $5,800 for the 5th and 6th quantiles, to $10,000
for the 70th, to $36,500 for the highest income decile. Like the dispersion
in total wealth, the range of personal ﬁnancial assets from the 10th to the
90th quantiles is extremely broad and the dispersion is even greater when
the top quantiles are considered, as in ﬁgure 1.4.
Almost all of the HRS respondents have had the opportunity to contrib-
ute to either an IRA or a 401(k) plan. It is not surprising, then, that per-
sonal retirement saving has become an important component of the wealth
of some HRS households. Quantiles of personal retirement saving assets
by lifetime earnings decile are shown in ﬁgure 1.5. Although personal re-
tirement accounts are now an important form of personal saving, only
about half of HRS households have such accounts. Most households in
the highest lifetime earnings deciles have such accounts but households in
the lowest deciles do not. Like the dispersions in personal ﬁnancial saving
and in total wealth, even for households with similar lifetime earnings the
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Fig. 1.3 Wealth quantiles: personal ﬁnancial assetsFig. 1.4 Top wealth quantiles: personal ﬁnancial assets
Fig. 1.5 Wealth quantiles: personal retirement assetsvariation in personal retirement assets is very large. Again, substantial
variation is observed in the top quantiles as shown in ﬁgure 1.6. Although
we have no way of knowing how much the IRA and 401(k)—as well as
Keogh—limits constrained the personal retirement saving of HRS house-
holds, it is likely that many households at the top quantiles were con-
strained by the limits.
1.3.2 Chance Events versus Saving Choice and Investment Choice
We want to obtain an indication of how much of the dispersion in saving
canb ea ttributed to chance and how much to choice: Chance is intended
to represent circumstances that may aﬀect the resources available for sav-
ing, given lifetime resources. We attribute to saving choice the dispersion
that remains after accounting for chance circumstances that limit or en-
hance resources. We also consider how much of the dispersion in wealth
can bea ttributed to the investment choice of savers. We proceed in two
steps: First, we consider how much of the dispersion in wealth can be
attributed to chance events; what is not accounted for by chance events,
we attribute to saving choice. Then we consider separately the eﬀect of
investment choice on the dispersion of wealth. We emphasize the eﬀect of
adjustment for chance events and investment choices on the distribution of
wealth within lifetime earnings deciles. Thus the exposition is necessarily
graphical, for the most part. We do present, however, some more-standard
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Fig. 1.6 Top wealth quantiles: personal retirement assetsmeasures of reduction in dispersion when chance events and investment
choices are accounted for.
In considering chance events that aﬀect resources we do not want to
control for education, ethnic group, and other attributes that may be corre-
lates of the taste for saving. Rather, we want to consider individual circum-
stances that may enhance or limit funds out of which saving could be
drawn. We consider inheritances and gifts, health status, age, number of
children, and marital status. Age, of course, is not a chance event, but the
rangeo fa ges of HRS household heads is likely to be systematically related
to asset accumulation. Children and marital status are also not truly
chance events. They might more properly be thought of as choices made
early in one’s lifetime that may later limit resources out of which saving
canb ed rawn. Thus we include these with chance events. In eﬀect, includ-
ing these household attributes tends to exaggerate the dispersion that
might be attributed to truly chance events.
That inheritances and gifts might ease the burden of saving seems clear.
Poor health and associated health expenditures may increase the burden
of saving. Health status may also aﬀectlifetime earnings and thus the earn-
ings deciles of households. However, the question here is whether, given
earnings, health status may aﬀect the resources out of which households
might plausibly save. Unfortunately, we have only limited indicators of
health status and know little about health over a person’s lifetime. Thus
we use health status at the time of the survey as an imperfect control for
medical circumstances. It is likely that expenses associated with children
also reduce the pool of resources that could be saved. Indeed, under some
circumstances children could be a substitute for saving for retirement. Fi-
nally, marital status, if only because of economies of scale, may be a deter-
minant of resources out of which saving could plausibly be drawn.
Within each lifetime earnings decile, we ﬁrst predict wealth with a
simple speciﬁcation of the form
(1) Wealth Constant Married) Never Married)
Widowed, Divorced, or Separated) No Children)
Number of Children if  >  0) Age)
Poor Health Single Person) Poor Health 1 of 2 in Family)
Poor Health 2 of 2 in Family) No Inheritances)
Amount of Inheritances Received   <  1980)
Amount of Inheritances Received 1980 to 1988)

































Choice, Chance, and Wealth Dispersion at Retirement 39with appropriate normalizing restrictions for the indicator variables. From
this equation, we obtain predicted wealth. Then, within each earnings dec-
ile, adjusted wealth is determined by






whichg ives distributions of adjusted and unadjusted (observed) wealth
with the same means.
We follow a similar procedure to determine the eﬀecto fi nvestment
choice on wealth dispersion. Even among households that save the same
proportion of earnings, accumulated wealth may diﬀer because some
households have invested savings in the stock market (for example), while
others have saved through bank saving account or money market funds.
Thea verage rate of return on stock investments is much higher than the
rate of return in money market funds, but the risk associated with stock
investments is also higher—or at least is perceived to be higher. Other
households invested primarily in housing, and so forth. We don’t know the
investment choices that households made over their lifetimes. The HRS
did, however, obtain information on the percent allocation of ﬁnancial as-
setsaving(excludingIRAand401[k]accounts)forﬁvecomponentsofﬁnan-
cial assets. We use this information, together with information on the
proportion of wealth in housing and ﬁve other asset categories, as an indi-
catoro fthe lifetime investment choices of a household. Within each life-
time earnings decile, we again predict wealth, but based on investment
choices, with a speciﬁcation of the form
(3) Wealth Constant % Wealth in Personal Financial Assets)
+%  Financial Assets in Stocks) + % Financial Assets in Bonds)
+%  Financial Assets in Money Market Accounts)
+%  Wealth in IRA, 401(k), and Keogh Accounts)
+%  Wealth in Employer Pensions)
+%  Wealth in Business Equity)+ % Wealth in Vehicles)


























To evaluate the dispersion in total ﬁnancial assets—including IRA,
401(k), and Keogh accounts—that might be accounted for by investment
choice, we use
40 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise(4) Total Financial Assets Constant
 Financial Assets in Stocks) % Financial Assets in Bonds)
+%  Financial Assets in Money Market Accounts)
+%  Financial Assets in Certificates of Deposit)














Again, we determine adjusted total ﬁnancial assets as in equation (2),
above.7
We could, of course, adjust for both chance events and investment
choice at the same time. Making separate adjustments to the same base,
however, allows us to compare the eﬀecto fchance events on wealth disper-
sion with the eﬀecto fi nvestment choices on dispersion. The two sets of
variables may be correlated, however. To the extent that they are positively
correlated, some of what is attributed to chance in the ﬁrst adjustment
should be attributed to investment choice instead, and some of what is
attributed to investment choice in the second adjustment should be attrib-
uted to chance events. Thus, this procedure maximizes the adjustment at-
tributed to each. (Standard measures of reduction in dispersion presented
below suggest that the correlation between the two sets of variables is
rather small, however.)
In referring to investment decisions as choice, it is important to distin-
guish this choice from risk—or the chance outcomes that the choice may
yield. It seems clear that part of the wealth accumulation of savers is due to
choice—conservative versus risky assets—and that part is due to chance.
Chance may play a particularly prominent role in housing investments.
Fore xample, a person who purchased a home in Boston twenty years ago
likely beneﬁtted from large capital gain. On the other hand, a person who
purchased in Houston may well have lost money. We will ﬁnd, however,
that the wide dispersion in accumulated wealth pertains to all forms of
assets; dispersion is not peculiar to housing equity. There is, of course, a
chance aspect to ﬁnancial asset accumulation as well. Given the level of
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6. Stocks include shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, and invest-
ment trusts. Bonds include corporate, municipal, government, or foreign bonds, and bond
funds. Money market accounts include checking or saving accounts and money market funds.
Certiﬁcates of deposit include certiﬁcates of deposit, government saving bonds, and treasury
bills. Other interest-bearing accounts include other saving or assets, such as money owed to
the individual by others; a valuable collection made for investment purposes; an annuity;
and rights in a trust or estate.
7. Because the shares of total wealth, or total ﬁnancial assets, can be calculated only if
wealth is positive, only observations with positive wealth values are included in the estima-
tion samples. This reduces the sample from 3,992 to 3,584 households.risk, somes avers will be winners and have large returns while others will
have lower returns. However, unlike a random shock to ﬁnancial resources
due, for example, to illness, this risk and associated distribution of shocks
to accumulation is chosen.
Figure 1.7 shows graphs of the adjusted compared to the unadjusted
quantiles for each lifetime earnings decile. The middle bar of each panel
shows unadjusted wealth quantiles. The bars behind show the quantiles
adjusted for investment choice. The bars in front show quantiles adjusted
for chance events, or individual circumstances. Overall, the adjustment for
individual circumstances does not have much eﬀecto nthe dispersion of
wealth. Thus we conclude that, for the most part, within-decile diﬀerences
in saving can be attributed to diﬀerences in the amount of earnings that
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Fig. 1.7 1st–10th earnings deciles, adjusted v. unadjusted wealth quantileshouseholds choose to save; some choose to save a good deal, many choose
to save very little. Some of the dispersion can be attributed to investment
choices. But investment choice, too, accounts for only a small part of the
dispersion in wealth within earnings deciles. Overall, the small reduction
in dispersion that can be attributed to chance events is about the same as
the reduction that can be attributed to investment choices. Or, put another
way: The increase in dispersion that results from diﬀering household in-
vestment choices is approximately the same as the increase that can be
attributed to chance events; both are small.
Thec omparisono fa djusted and unadjusted distributions, however,
does reveal some systematic patterns. With respect to the adjustment for
chance events: First, the adjustment reduces the 95th and 98th quantiles
in almost every decile, and the reduction in the 98th quantile is especially
noticeable. Second, for the 5th to the 10th deciles, the adjustment for
chance events has very little eﬀecto nall but the extreme quantiles. Modest
leveling occurs within the 3rd and 4th deciles, with the 90th quantile re-
duced a bit and the lower quantiles raised a bit. Third, the greatest leveling
occurs in the 1st and 2nd lifetime earnings deciles, in which the highest
quantiles are reduced and the lowest quantiles raised. Still, in all deciles
an enormous dispersion in assets remains after adjusting for the individual
circumstances.
The adjustment for investment choices also reveals some systematic pat-
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Fig. 1.7 (cont.)terns. This adjustment has little eﬀecto nw e alth dispersion in the bottom
three lifetime earnings deciles. The greatest eﬀects are in the upper deciles.
The 98th quantile is reduced in almost every decile, especially in the upper
ones.T he 95th quantile is reduced in most deciles as well, but only margin-
ally in all but the 6th, 8th, and 10th deciles. The lower quantiles tend to
be raised in each earnings decile.
Finally, controlling for education and ethnic group (which are typically
found to be related to saving and presumably inﬂuence the taste for saving)
has only a very modest eﬀecto nthe distributions. By way of illustration,
ﬁgure 1.8 shows the quantiles for the 7th earnings decile when these vari-
ables are added to the list of individual circumstances. The principle eﬀect
of the addition of these “taste” variables is to increase a bit the lower
quantiles. Nonetheless, the major dispersion remains: Some people choose
to save, and others don’t.
Forc omparison, more traditional measures of unconditional versus con-
ditional variance (controlling for individual circumstances) are shown in
table 1.5. Starting with the unconditional variance in wealth, controlling
for lifetime earnings decile reduces the residual standard deviation by 5.05
percent. When lifetime earnings decile plus the individual chance events
arec ontrolled for (with complete interaction of earnings decile and attri-
butes), the reduction is 9.08 percent. Thus 4.03 percent (9.08 percent 
5.05 percent) might be attributed to the chance events. When lifetime earn-
ings decile plus investment choices are controlled for (again with complete
interaction of earnings decile and investment choice), the reduction is
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Fig. 1.8 7th earnings decile: adjusted v. unadjusted wealth quantiles12.98 percent, and 7.93 percent (12.98 percent  5.05 percent) might be
attributed to investment choice. Thus, by this conventional measure, only
a small proportion of the dispersion in wealth can be attributed to chance
events. Little of the dispersion can be attributed to the investment choices
of savers. By these measures, the eﬀecto fi nvestment choice is somewhat
greater than the eﬀecto fchance.
Controlling for earnings decile, chance events, and investment choice
reduces the residual standard deviation by 15.32 percent. Or, 10.27 percent
(15.32 percent  5.05 percent) can be attributed to both chance events
and investment choices together. The maximum that can be attributed to
chance events, plus the maximum that can be attributed to investment
choice, which is 11.96 percent (4.03 percent  7.93 percent), is not much





(A). Lifetime earnings decile 5.05
(B). (A)  chance variables 9.08
(C). (A)  investment choice variables 12.98
(D). (A)  (B)  (C) 15.32
(E). (D)  “taste variables” (education and race) 16.00
By Lifetime Earnings Decile
Control Variables
Chance Investment (D)  “Taste Variables”
Variables Choice Variables (B)  (C) (education and race)
Decile (B) (C) (D) (E)
1st 6.84 7.18 10.29 10.12
2nd 23.15 8.29 26.41 27.90
3rd 1.47 9.39 10.33 10.54
4th 26.55 15.01 32.67 32.83
5th 3.35 16.30 16.91 17.82
6th 5.22 12.17 14.29 25.58
7th 9.88 13.78 19.52 20.70
8th 2.32 13.53 13.67 15.45
9th 1.88 19.67 19.76 19.98
10th 4.00 17.52 19.49 21.02
Source: See table 1.3.
Notes: Because shares could not be computed if total wealth is less than or equal to zero, only families
with positive levels of total wealth are used. The following investment shares were used: ﬁnancial assets,
personal retirement saving, traditional pension assets, business equity, vehicles, home equity, and other
real estate.
Choice, Chance, and Wealth Dispersion at Retirement 45greater than the reduction of 10.27 percent that can be attributed to both
jointly. Thus there is little correlation between the two sets of factors; if
there were no correlation, the sum of the individual reductions would
equal the joint reduction.
The eﬀecto fc ontrolling for chance events and for investment choice
within earnings decile is shown in the second panel of table 1.5. Control-
ling for chance events typically reduces the residual standard deviation by
only af ew percentage points (although as high as 23 percent in the 2nd
and 27 percent in the 4th decile). Thus, within earnings deciles, little of
the dispersion can be ascribed to these individual attributes. Controlling
fori nvestment choice typically yields a larger reduction in residual vari-
ance than controlling for the chance events. In this case the reduction
rangesfrom about 3 percent to 16 percent. In the higher deciles, in particu-
lar, the reduction due to investment choice is around 13 percent on aver-
age, whereas the reduction due to chance events is around 4 percent on
average. Although these measures are not inconsistent with the graphical
information, they provide no detail on how the distribution of wealth may
be aﬀected by the individual attributes, and that is what we wish to empha-
size;t hus the ﬁgures highlighted above.
We have focused on the dispersion of total wealth. Within lifetime earn-
ings deciles, wide dispersion characterizes all asset categories. Little of the
dispersion can be attributed to individual household circumstances. For
example, ﬁgure 1.9 shows adjusted and unadjusted quantiles for personal
ﬁnancial assets (including personal retirement assets) for households in
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Fig. 1.9 7th earnings decile: adjusted v. unadjusted ﬁnancial wealththe 7th lifetime earnings decile. Although the top adjusted quantiles are
lower than the unadjusted quantiles, overall, the adjustment has only a
modest eﬀecto nthe dispersion.
1.4 The Wealth That Consistent Saving Would Have Produced
We see that a large fraction of households on the eve of retirement have
meager ﬁnancial asset saving and, indeed, limited total wealth. We now
ask what the wealth of HRS respondents might have been had they saved
consistently for retirement throughout their working lives. The answer to
this question can be illustrative only, because it requires a choice of saving
rate out of income and a choice of rate of return. We make calculations
based on several diﬀerent saving rates and rate of return values. Basically,
we ask, What if a proportion s of earnings had been savede ach year, and
each year this saving had been invested in assets earning a rate of return
r?8 Using a given s and a given r,w ec alculate the resulting asset accumula-
tion of our sample. There is one important limitation to this method: His-
torical earnings are reported only up to the Social Security earnings limit,
as emphasized above. Actual earnings in these deciles may be substantially
higher than Social Security reported earnings.
Because of this limitation of the Social Security data, we also make
calculations based on the annual March Current Population Survey (CPS),
whichr eports earnings well above the Social Security maximum.9 We fol-
low this procedure: (a) We identify lifetime earnings deciles, as described
above, using the Social Security earnings histories of each family in the
HRS. (b) Using the annual March CPS, we calculate earned income dec-
iles by age for the years 1964–91. Using published data on median earnings
prior to 1964, we extrapolate this series back to 1955. Thus we obtain CPS
earnings histories by decile for the years 1955 to 1991. (c) To compare the
Social Security with the analogous CPS data, we assign each HRS house-
hold to a CPS decile according to the household Social Security earnings
decile. The CPS earnings histories begin at age twenty-ﬁve, and a given
household is assumed to have been in the same decile since age twenty-
ﬁve. (d) Using this earnings proﬁle and these saving and rate of return
values, we calculate accumulated wealth up to the age of the respondent
at the time of the survey in 1992.
Results for several saving rates (s)a nd nominal investment returns (r)
are shown in table 1.6. For each combination of s and r, the ﬁrst column
presents results using only the Social Security earnings data. The second
column shows the results of the alternative calculation based on the CPS
8. These calculations assume a constant rate of saving as a person ages.
9. The ratio of the CPS maximum to the Social Security maximum has ranged from a low
of just under 2 in 1981 to a high of over 20 in 1964. In 1991 the CPS reported earnings up
toamaximum of $200,000; the Social Security maximum was $53,400 in that year.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.earnings data. Calculations are made for three values of s (5, 10, and 15
percent) and two values of r (6 and 12.5 percent). The assumed values of
s reﬂect what we believe to be “reasonable” rates ofs a v i n gf o rhouseholds.
Indeed, if saving is broadly deﬁned to include investments in housing, bus-
inesses, pensions, and vehicles, then a rate of even 15 percent may be con-
servative. The rates of return of 6 percent and 12.5 percent are the mean
annual returns for long-term corporate bonds and the Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) index, respectively, between 1926 and 1995.
For the most part, the Social Security earnings histories and the CPS
constructed histories yield rather similar results, although the CPS histo-
ries are associated with greater wealth accumulation. The greatest diﬀer-
enceso c cur at the top earnings deciles and are typically larger for large
saving rates and rates of return. The actual assets with which these accu-
mulations should be compared is unclear. We are inclined to compare these
values to all ﬁnancial assets that might be used for support in retirement—
that is, personal retirement assets, ﬁrm pension assets, and other personal
ﬁnancial assets. For convenience, the medians of these assets are shown
by lifetime earnings decile in the ﬁrst column of table 1.7. Since housing
equity typically is not used to ﬁnance retirement spending, at least not
until advanced ages, it is convenient to make comparisons excluding hous-
ing equity, which is the largest asset of the majority of households. In any
case,to talwealthisalsoshowninthesecondcolumnoftable1.7.(Thecom-
parison should be with the actual median, and not the mean, because the
same saving and rates of return are assigned to all households. In addition,
within a decile, the same CPS earnings are assigned to all households.)
Saving rates of 10 percent would typically yield much larger assets than
the median of actual total ﬁnancial assets. Consider the 6th lifetime in-
Table 1.7 Actual Median Total Financial Assets and Total Wealth, by Lifetime
Earnings Decile











Source: See table 1.3.
Note: Total ﬁnancial assets include personal retirement, ﬁrm pension, and other ﬁnancial
assets.
Choice, Chance, and Wealth Dispersion at Retirement 49come decile, for example. The ﬁgure for actual median total ﬁnancial
assets in this decile is $46,882. With a rate of return of 6 percent, a saving
rate of 10 percent would have produced median assets of about $100,000
at the time of the survey. At the average rate of return for the S&P 500,
the accumulation would have been between $250,000 and $300,000. The
actual median of total (ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial) wealth in the 6th decile
is $126,082. In all income deciles, the “as if” accumulation of ﬁnancial
assets is much larger than the actual accumulation of ﬁnancial assets. In-
deed, for saving rates of 10 percent and the S&P 500 rate of return, the
“as if” potential accumulation is much larger than total actual wealth. The
average age of the HRS respondents is only ﬁfty-six, however, so assets
projected to age sixty-ﬁve could easily be more than double those reported
in table 1.6. Nonetheless, these potential saving accumulations are in stark
contrast with the actual saving of these families. With the illustrative life-
time saving rates and investment returns, families in all but the lowest
decile would have accumulated sizable wealth by the time of the HRS
survey.10
Saving rates like those used in these illustrative calculations are likely to
be increasingly common with the continuing spread of 401(k) plans. For
example, if current trends continue, it would not be unusual for a person
to contribute 10 percent of earnings to a 401(k) and to invest in an S&P
500 index mutual fund. It is easy to see that consistent lifetime saving,
perhaps through a 401(k) plan, could yield large asset accumulations for a
very substantial fraction of households. This prospect is considered in
some detail by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998).
1.5 Self-assessed Saving Adequacy, Attitudes toward Saving,
and Asset Accumulation
Twoe xperimental saving modules were administered to subsamples of
respondents in the third wave of the HRS. Each of the two modules was
given to 10 percent of respondents, although not the same respondents.
The goal of these experimental modules was to explore possibilities for
discovering more about the attributes of persons who save compared to
those who don’t, with the ultimate goal of understanding more about what
determines saving behavior. In addition, the modules asked respondents
about the adequacy of their retirement saving. We explore here the rela-
tionship between responses to the saving module questions and realized
saving as described in section 1.3.
Thee xperimental module sample sizes are small. There are 460 observa-
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10. In the CPS data, families in the lowest Social Security earnings decile are assumed to
have been in the lowest earnings decile in all years. Thus in most years these families are
assumed to be zero earners.tionsi no ne of the two that we use, and 390 in the other. About half of
these observations are not used here, primarily because of missing Social
Security records.11 Thus, we need a convenient way to measure the realized
saving of each household in such a way that we can avoid separate analyses
by lifetime earnings decile. The 10 percent samples do not yield large
enough sample sizes to do this reliably. Thus we calculate a variable Q,
whichi nthis paper is the within-decile wealth quantile of each household.
Fore xample, if a household has wealth just at the median of other house-
holds within an earnings decile, the Q assigned to this household is 50.
This measure is independent of earnings decile. It tells us how the wealth
of each household compares to the wealth of other households with similar
lifetime earnings. Thus two households in diﬀerent lifetime earnings dec-
iles but with the same Q canb ethought of as having a similar taste for
saving. Households with diﬀerent Q values have diﬀerent tastes for saving.
We ﬁrst consider the relationship between self-assessed adequacy of
saving and Q.T a b l e1.8 shows respondent answers to several questions,
together with their Q values. The ﬁrst question asked whether the respon-
dent’s saving over the past twenty or thirty years was “About right,” “Too
little,” or “Too much.” Almost 75 percent of the respondents said “Too
little.” About 25 percent said “About right.” Virtually no one said




Question Response Percent QQ
Over the past twenty or thirty years, do About right 24 61 64
you think now what you saved was Too little 76 46 43
(M9-4): Too mucha
If you could do it again, do you think you About the same 31 57 55
would save (M9-4c): More 69 45 46
Lessb
Including Social Security and pensions,
will you have enough saving to
maintain your living standard after Yes 67 58 57
retirement? (M10-10) No 33 46 46
If yes: How do you expect your
standard of living in retirement to Higher 8 44 50
comparet oyour present standard of Same 75 60 58
living? (M10-11f) Lower 17 60 54
Source: Tabulations from experimental savings modules of the 1996 HRS.
aLess than 2 percent of the respondents answered “Too much,” and these responses have been excluded.
bLess than1p ercent of the respondents answered “Less,” and these responses have been excluded.
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11. There is no reason to believe that these exclusions are not random, as shown in table 1.1.“Too much.” Those who said “About right” had an average Q with respect
to total wealth of 61—meaning that, on average, they were at the 61st
percentile of the total wealth distribution within their lifetime earnings
decile. Those who responded “Too little” had an average Q of 46. Thus a
large fraction of respondents say they saved too little, and they have Q
values substantially lower than those who say they saved enough. (To
judge the diﬀerence in wealth of these two groups, the 61st quantile is
typically about one and one-half to two times the size of the 46th quantile.)
The last column of the table reports Q values based on total ﬁnancial
assets, including IRAs and 401(k) balances. Comparisons based on ﬁnan-
cial assets typically parallel those based on total wealth, as they do in this
case.A pparently consistent with responses to the ﬁrst question, the next
question reveals that about two-thirds of respondents said they would save
more if they could do it again, and about a third said they would save
about the same.
The third question asked whether, including Social Security and pen-
sions, the respondent would have enough saving to maintain his or her
standard of living after retirement, 67 percent said yes and only 33 percent
said no. Thus, many households who say they did not save enough also
say they will be able to maintain their standard of living in retirement.
However, of those who said yes, the average Q was 58; it waso n l y4 6f o r
those who said no. Apparently a substantial portion of respondents with
relatively low Q say they will be able to maintain their standards of living
(e.g., if those who said yes have Q values between 16 and 100, the average
would be 58), even though many of these also say they have saved too little.
Of those who answered yes, about 75 percent said they could maintain the
same standard.
From the experimental modules, can we learn anything about the rela-
tionship between individual attributes and realized asset accumulation?
Apparently we can. Table 1.9 shows responses to a series of questions
abouti ndividual behavior or attitudes together with average Q values. It
is clear that there is a strong relationship between the age at which respon-
dents started saving for retirement and Q:T h o s ew h ostarted saving before
age twenty-ﬁve have an average Q of 63. Q declines consistently with post-
ponement of retirement saving; respondents who never started to save for
retirement have an average Q of 37.
It also appears that having a target or planned level of saving makes a
diﬀerence. Those who said they had such a target have an average Q of
56, while those who had no target have an average Q of 48. Most of those
whoh a dat arget also said they had a plan for achieving that target, and
most also said the plan included trying to save something out of each
paycheck. If the plan included saving out of each paycheck, the average Q
was 59; if not, the average Q was 36. A question on a diﬀerent module
asked simply: “Over the past years, did you have a plan for retirement




Question Response Percent QQ
At what age did you start saving for 25 13 63 58
retirement? (M9-3) 26–35 17 57 56
36–45 21 54 53
46–55 20 48 49
56 3 47 45
Never 26 37 34
Thinking over the past twenty or thirty Yes 23 56 54
years, did you have somet a r get or No 77 48 46
planned level of saving? (M9-5)
If yes: Did you have a plan for Yes 81 59 56
achieving that goal? (M9-5a) No 19 55 47
If yes: Did the plan include trying to Yes 92 59 56
save something out of each No 8 36 41
paycheck? (M9-5b)
Over the past years, did you have a plan Yes 47 60 63
for retirement saving? (M10-4) No 53 48 44
How well do these statements describe
you? (0 means doesn’t, 10m e ans
closely) (M10-20)
In ever seemed to get caught up on my 0–3 43 53 54
bills so I could save for the future. 4–6 28 57 58
7–10 28 51 47
Ic o uld never stick to a saving plan. 0–3 44 57 61
4–6 26 50 45
7–10 30 53 51
I thought Social Security or employer 0–3 44 58 59
pensions would take care of my 4–6 28 52 52
retirement income. 7–10 28 50 46
If you put $10,000 in a saving account $35,000 16 54 52
when aget wenty-ﬁve, how much $35,000–75,000 33 46 45
would you have now, ata5p e r c e n t $75,000–105,000 29 48 46
interest rate? $105,000 22 58 58
Thinking of your planning for retirement
over the past twenty or thirty years,
how important did you think the
following sources would be in
providing your retirement income?
(0 means unimportant, 10 means
very important) (M9-2)
Social Security 0–3 8 68 55
4–6 24 54 49
7–10 68 47 48
Employer-provided pension 0–3 23 44 41
4–6 16 41 39
7–10 62 55 54
(continued)saving?” In response to this question, 47 percent said yes, and they had an
average Q of 60; 53 percent said no and had an average Q of 48. The
implications are that having a plan to save for retirement contributes to
asset accumulation, and that trying to save something out of each pay-
check may be the key to greater asset accumulation.
Theq uestions asking how respondents would characterize themselves
seemo nly weakly related to asset accumulation. Those who said they
could never “get caught up on [their] bills” or that they could “never stick
toas a ving plan” accumulated about the same as those who said these
attributes did not describe them. Given the promise of Social Security
beneﬁts, it may be that many households rationally choose to save little,
in particular those with low lifetime earnings, for whom the Social Security
replacement rate is relatively high. But only about a quarter of respondents
said they “thought Social Security or employer pensions would take care
of [their] retirement income.” The average Q of this group was 50, not
much lower than the average of 58 for those who said this view did not
characterize them. The diﬀerence in Q values for total ﬁnancial assets is
greater—46 versus 59. Thus the responses suggest some relationship be-
tween expected Social Security and employer pension beneﬁts and other
saving, but certainly not enough to explain the very low asset accumula-
tion of a large fraction of respondents. Even for respondents in the lower
lifetime earnings deciles there appears to be little relationship between the
anticipated importance of Social Security and Q values for total wealth,
as shown in the tabulation that follows. The responses do suggest, however,
that respondents in the lower earnings deciles who anticipated that Social
Security and pensions would be important have lower total ﬁnancial asset
Q values than those who thought Social Security and pensions would be
lessi mportant.
IRAs, 401(k) or Keogh 0–3 36 45 39
4–6 22 49 47
7–10 41 54 56
Other personal saving or investment 0–3 21 36 33
4–6 27 45 42
7–10 52 58 57
Other sources 0–3 47 44 44
4–6 31 51 50
7–10 23 61 54





Question Response Percent QQ
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Response 1st–3rd 4th–7th 8th–10th
Total Wealth Q
0t o3 5 9 63 56
4t o6 6 1 56 42
7t o1 0 6 0 4 5 5 2
Total Financial Asset Q
0t o3 5 6 65 57
4t o6 5 9 54 45
7t o1 0 3 6 4 2 5 1
This sort of ﬁnding might be contrasted with results based on theoretical
models of economic behavior. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995), for
example, use a life-cycle model of saving, which accounts for precaution-
ary motivesf or saving, to simulate the dispersion in wealth of low-income
households in particular. They show how under their model social insur-
ance programs with asset-based means testing can discourage saving by
households with low expected lifetime incomes.
Could limited ﬁnancial literacy be one reason some people don’t save?
To explore this possibility, the survey posed a question intended to test
respondents’ understanding of compound interest. Respondents were
asked what they thought would be the current value of $10,000 saved at
age twenty-ﬁve if the interest rate had been 5 percent. Depending on the
ageo fthe respondent in 1992, the appropriate answer is between $40,000
and $70,000. Although a small proportion of respondents give answers be-
low this range, more than half give answers well above this range; about a
third are within the range. However, there seems to be no clear relationship
to asset accumulation.
Finally, the saving modules include a series of questions about antici-
pated sources of retirement income. Respondents who thought Social Se-
curity beneﬁts would be important have an average Q of 47; those who
thought Social Security beneﬁts would be unimportant have an average Q
of 65. The question discussed above, which asked whether the statement
that “Social Security or employer pensions would take care of [the respon-
dent’s] retirement income” described the respondent’s saving behavior,
seemed related only to the saving of persons with low lifetime earnings.
Ther e sponse to this question suggests a more general correspondence be-
tween reliance on Social Security and saving. Greater anticipated impor-
tance of IRAs and 401(k) plans would almost surely be associated with
greater wealth because they are included in total wealth and in total ﬁ-
nancial assets. Employer-provided pensions, however, are not included in
total ﬁnancial assets. Keeping in mind that Q controls for earnings decile,
it is rather striking to ﬁnd that respondents who anticipate that pensions
Choice, Chance, and Wealth Dispersion at Retirement 55will be important in retirement have an average Q of 55, while those who
say pensions will be unimportant have an average Q of only 44. Such evi-
dence may perhaps support the view that saving has a multiplier eﬀect:
Saving in one way induces saving in other forms, as well. Having an em-
ployer pension, for example, may be accompanied by information about
ﬁnancial needs in retirement.
In addition to the questions discussed above, the experimental modules
asked respondents whether, in thinking about their ﬁnancial futures, they
were concerned about several events: job loss, ﬁnancial market collapse,
and health care costs. The results arep r esented in table 1.10. Few were
very concerned about job loss or ﬁnancial market collapse, but a large
number of respondents were concerned about potential health care costs.
Thec oncern with health care costs is weakly related to Q.J o bloss, on the
other hand, is a much greater concern for those with low Q than for those
with higher Q:T hose who say they aren’t concerned with job loss have an
average Q of 55, while those who are very concerned have an average Q
of only 39. Concern with ﬁnancial market collapse is not strongly related
to Q, although those who are more concerned about this event have some-




Question Response Percent QQ
In thinking about your
ﬁnancial future, how
concerned are you with
(M9-7):
health care costs? Hardly 19 54 50
Some 29 52 53
Al o t 5 2 47 44
job loss? Hardly 67 55 52
Some 15 44 50
Al o t 1 8 39 36
ﬁnancial market collapse? Hardly 43 45 43
Some 31 55 55
Al o t 2 6 53 51
costs of supporting parents? Hardly 78 51 51
Some 13 47 38
Al o t 8 4 5 4 2
costs of supporting children? Hardly 64 51 51
Some 23 54 49
Al o t 1 3 39 38
Source: See table 1.8
56 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wisewhat higher Q values than those who are unconcerned, perhaps as should
be expected.
1.6 Conclusions and Discussion
In 1953, Milton Friedman wrote a paper he titled “Choice, Chance, and
the Personal Distribution of Income.” In this paper he states:
Diﬀerencesa mong individuals or families in the amount of income re-
ceiveda re generally regarded as reﬂecting . . . circumstances largely out-
side the control of the individuals concerned, such as unavoidable
chance occurrences and diﬀerences in natural endowment and inherited
wealth....T h ew a yt h a ti n d i vidual choice can aﬀect the distribution of
income has been less frequently noticed.T he alternatives open to an
individual diﬀer,a mong other respects, in the probability distribution
of income they promise. Hence his choice among them depends in part
on his taste for risk....T h ef o r egoing analysis is exceedingly tenta-
tive....Y e tIthink it goes far enough to demonstrate that one cannot
rule out the possibility that a large part of the existing inequality of
wealth can be regarded as produced by men to satisfy their tastes and
preferences. (277–78, 289–90)
Now, more than forty years later, “People earn just enough to get by” is
ap hrase often used to explain the low personal saving rate in the United
States. The implicit presumption is that households simply do not earn
enough both to pay for current needs and to save. Yet in other developed
countries the saving rate at all income levels is much higher than in the
United States. Even in Canada—in many respects similar to the United
States—the personal saving rate is almost twice as high as in the United
States. Such international comparisons alone suggest that saving depends
on much more than lifetime earnings.
We show in this paper that at all levels of lifetime earnings there is an
enormous dispersion in the accumulated wealth of families approaching
retirement. In the United States it is not only households with low incomes
that save little. A signiﬁcant proportion of high-income households also
save very little. Furthermore, not all low-income households are non-
savers. Indeed, a substantial proportion of low-income households saves a
great deal. We then consider the extent to which diﬀerences in household
lifetime ﬁnancial resources explain the wide dispersion in wealth, given
lifetime earnings. We ﬁnd that very little of this dispersion can be ex-
plained by chance diﬀerences in individual circumstances—“largely out-
side the control of the individuals”—that might limit the resources from
whichs a ving might plausibly be made. Thus we conclude that the bulk of
the dispersion must be attributed to diﬀerences in the amount that house-
holds choose to save. Choices vary enormously across households. Some
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choose to save little and spend more while working. Wide dispersion in
saving is evident at all levels of lifetime earnings, from the lowest to the
highest. The diﬀerences in saving choices among households with similar
lifetime earnings lead to vastly diﬀerent levels of asset accumulation by
the time retirement age approaches.
Perhaps more closely related to the choice of risk that Friedman empha-
sized,w ealso consider how much of the dispersion in wealth might be
accounted for by diﬀerent investment choices of savers—some more risky,
some lessr isky—again, given lifetime earnings. We ﬁnd that investment
choice matters but that it is not a major determinant of the dispersion in
asset accumulation. It matters about as much as chance events that limit
the available resources of households with the same lifetime earnings.
Thus, although investment choices make a diﬀerence, the overwhelming
determinant of the accumulation of wealth at retirement is simply the
choice to save.
As a benchmark, we also considered the assets that the HRS respon-
dents would have accumulated had they saved given amounts over their
working lives and had earned given returns on their saving. Saving 10 per-
cent of earnings and earning the average annual S&P 500 return (which
has been 12.2 percent since 1926) would have led to accumulated assets
much much greater than the typical ﬁnancial assets of HRS households
at the time of the survey.
Perhaps based on the presumption—contrary to Friedman’s conjec-
ture—that diﬀerences in wealth can be attributed more to diﬀerences
across households in adverse circumstances that limit saving, rather than
to explicit individual choices, government policy often penalizes persons
whoh aves aved over their lifetimes. For example, persons with the same
lifetime earnings will face very diﬀerent tax rates on Social Security bene-
ﬁts: Those who saved will pay higher taxes while those who didn’t will pay
lower taxes. Shoven and Wise (1997, 1998) show that persons who save
toom uch through personal or employer-provided pensions face enormous
tax penalties when they use these accumulated assets for retirement sup-
port. The evidence that diﬀerences in retirement wealth are due largely to
saving choice while younger brings into question this tendency in tax pol-
icy. Although the distribution of the tax burden will inevitably be based
on many factors, most observers believe that the extent to which older
persons with more assets are taxed more should depend in part on how
they acquired the assets. Chance accumulation may weigh on the side of
heavier taxes on those who have accumulated. On the other hand, accumu-
lation by choosing to consume less when young, while others choose to
consume more when young, weighs against heavier taxes on those who
accumulate assets for retirement. As emphasized at the outset, this paper is
about the dispersion in the accumulation of assets of persons with similar
58 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wiselifetime earnings. The issue raised here is not about progressive income
taxation, but rather, given the same after-tax earnings, about diﬀerences
in the tax imposed on persons who save today in order to spend more
tomorrow,v ersus those who spend all today. Our analysis suggests that a
very large proportion of the variation in the wealth of older households
canb ea ttributed to household saving choices while younger rather than
to chance events that may have limited the resources available for saving.
To the extent that most asset accumulation is due to choice rather than
chance, our results also suggest that ex ante taxing of saving may have
more serious consequences for saving than may previously have been
thought.
Finally, we explored the relationship between household saving and in-
formation abouth ousehold saving that was obtained through two experi-
mental saving modules administered in the third wave of the HRS. In gen-
eral, the experimental module responses were consistent with household
realized asset accumulation. About three fourths of respondents said they
had saved too little over the past twenty or thirty years, and we found a
strong relationship between our Q value—a household’s percentile level
of assets, given lifetime earnings—and whether respondents thought they
had saved enough. The accumulation of retirement assets is very strongly
related to the age at which persons began to save for retirement. In addi-
tion, persons who accumulated more retirement assets tended to have a
saving target or plan, and the plan typically included saving a portion of
each paycheck. Those who accumulated little were more likely to say that
they just couldn’t get caught up on their bills or that they had a hard time
sticking to a saving plan. Low saving rates seem to be related only weakly
to an expectation that Social Security or employer pension plans would
take care of retirement income, even among households with low lifetime
earnings. The potential cost of health care is an important concern of a
large fraction of households, and this concern appears to be unrelated to
asset accumulation. On the other hand, there appears to be relatively little
concern about job loss, supporting children or parents, or ﬁnancial market
collapse. The results from the HRS experimental saving modules suggests




The analysis is based on the ﬁrst wave of the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS), which sampled families with heads aged age ﬁfty-one to
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7,702 households. For two reasons our analysis was based on only 3,992
households.
First, in 379 married or partnered households, one of the respondents
did not respond to the survey. Because the pension wealth of both mem-
bers is a critical component of the analysis, we have deleted these house-
holds from the sample.
Second, the analysis relies heavily on lifetime income as measured by
Social Security earnings records. These records are available for only 8,257
of the 12,652 HRS respondents. The analysis is based on household rather
than individual respondent data. Historical earnings for a single-person
household required only that Social Security earnings records be available
for that person. For a two-person household, it was necessary to have his-
torical earnings for both persons in the household if both had been in the
labor force for a signiﬁcant length of time. The HRS obtained such data
for 1,625 single-person households and for 2,751 two-person households,
together comprising 4,376 of the 7,607 HRS households.
Twor elated sample adjustments were made. First, we retained house-
holds in which one or both members reported never having worked, even
if the household member was missing a Social Security earnings record.
We assumed zero earnings for such persons. Second, we excluded from
the sample all households that included any member who had zero Social
Security earnings and whor eported working for any level of government
for ﬁve (not necessarily consecutive) years. This latter restriction is in-
tended to exclude households that have zero Social Security earnings due
to gaps in Social Security coverage. The ﬁnal sample includes 3,992 house-
holds.
Wealth
Total wealth is comprised of the following broad categories:
Financial Assets: Stocks, mutual funds, investment trusts, checking or sav-
ing account balances, money market funds, CDs, government saving
bonds, treasury bills, bonds, bond funds, and other savings or assets,
less unsecured debt.
Personal Retirement Assets: IRA, Keogh, and 401(k) balances.
Firm Pension Assets: Deﬁned-contribution plan balances (other than
401[k]) and the present value of promised deﬁned-beneﬁt plan beneﬁts.
(See the section “Pension Wealth,” following.)
Net Vehicle Equity
Net Business Equity
Real Estate: Real estate other than main home, net of debt
60 Steven F. Venti and David A. WiseHome Equity: Value of primary residence less outstanding balances on all
mortgages, home equity loans, and lines of credit used.
Pension Wealth
Imputation of Key Missing Data
It is particularly diﬃcult to produce a measure of pension wealth for
this sample.12 Many respondents were missing key pieces of data needed
to construct pension wealth. For some types of pensions, less than half of
the respondents provided data complete enough to calculate pension
wealth directly. A brief overview of the procedures used to impute these
missing data follows.
In the HRS, the information required to construct pension wealth
comes from three sources: the pension on the current job for persons still
working, the pension on the last job for persons no longer working, and
pension income by source for persons receiving beneﬁts.13
All currently employed workers were asked if they were “included in”
ap ension plan “through your work” (if self-employed), or if they were
“included” in a pension plan “sponsored by your employer or union” (if
nots elf-employed). Each respondent could list up to three plans. About
76 percent of the respondents listed a single plan, 21 percent listed two
plans, and the remaining 3 percent of the respondents listed three plans.
Respondents were most likely to cite a deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plan as their
ﬁrst plan. Of the ﬁrst plans reported, 61 percent were DB and 34 percent
were deﬁned contribution (DC) plans. Of the second plans reported, only
16 percent were DB; 81 percent were DC. Most of the third plans reported
were DC.
Fore ach of the three plans, if the reported plan type was DB, “both,”
or “don’t know,” then the respondent was ﬁrst asked the expected age of
retirement, then asked to give an estimate of the pension beneﬁt at retire-
ment. The beneﬁt could be expressed as a percentage of ﬁnal salary, as an
amount ($) per unit of time (month, quarter, year, etc.), or as a lump sum
at retirement. Most respondents (44 percent) gave an amount per unit of
time, and we have converted these to annual pension beneﬁts. For those
providing a percent of ﬁnal salary (15 percent) we have also computed an
annual pension beneﬁt using an assumed (see below) annual rate of growth
of earnings until the expected date of retirement. Still, data are missing;
12. Our estimates of pension wealth are based on the respondent’s report of the provisions
of employer-sponsored pension plans. The HRS also conducted a survey of employers. Infor-
mation from this latter survey is not used in this analysis.
13. There is also some information on pensions associated with previous jobs (other than
the last job), but we judged these data to be too incomplete to use at this time.
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sion beneﬁts we ﬁrst divide the sample by the number of plans (three could
be listed), type of response (DB, DC, or both), and ten wage-and-salary
income deciles. We then used a hotdeck imputation procedure using these
ninety cells.14
If the reported plan type is “DC” or “both,” then the survey asks for
the balance accumulated in the plan. Missing data, although still a prob-
lem, are not as severe as for DB plans: For 71 percent of DC plans an ac-
count balance is reported. If the plan type is DC, then further details on
the type of plan are requested. Responses to these detailed questions are
used to categorize DC contributions as contributions to either “401(k)
plans” or to “traditional DC plans.” Our deﬁnition of “401(k) plans”
broadly includes the HRS response categories “401(k)/403(b)/SRA,”
“thrift of saving plan,” “tax shelter,” “IRA/SEP,” “SEPP,” or any response
combination that includes these (e.g., some respondents indicate their
plans to be a combination of a 401[k] and a thrift plan). The category
“traditional DC plans” covers the remaining types of DC plans, including
ESOPs and money purchase plans. If a respondent indicated plan type
“both,” then no detailed questions about plan type were asked. For these
plans the entire balance is assumed to be in a “traditional DC plan,” thus
perhaps underestimating 401(k) balances. For plans known to be DC, but
forw hich the balance is unknown, the hotdeck imputation method is again
used, based on plan number, plan type (traditional DC and 401[k]), and
ten wage-and-salary income deciles.
Persons not currently employed are asked about their most recent job.
As above, they can specify four pension types: DB, DC, both, and don’t
know (DK). However, each respondent could provide information on only
one plan. In general, the follow-up questions parallel the questions asked
for the current job discussed above. We will note only the diﬀerences here.
First, persons covered by DB plans are asked about expected future bene-
ﬁts, beneﬁts currently being received, and beneﬁts already distributed as a
lump sum. We disregard all but the former because beneﬁts currently re-
ceiveda re picked up elsewhere in the survey (the income section, see be-
low), and beneﬁts already paid out will show up as IRA balances if rolled
over (and do not represent pension wealth if not). If covered by a DC
plan, the balance is included only if “left to accumulate” with the former
employer. DC balances rolled over into an IRA, converted to an annuity,
or withdrawn are not included. Finally, respondents who indicated cover-
ageb y“both” plan types were asked, “How much money was in your
account when you left that employer?” The survey does not ask how much
remains in the account as of the survey date. Based on the proportion of
14. About 9 percent of the DB plans were also missing the expected age of retirement. We
use the modal response of age sixty-two in these cases.
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include the balances of 33 percent of these respondents. Again, missing
DB beneﬁts and DC data are imputed by the hotdeck method described
above. Unfortunately, there is no way to distinguish between 401(k) bal-
ances and traditional DC plan balances acquired on prior jobs. Thus, all
DC balances are assumed to be from traditional DC plans.
The ﬁnal source of information on pension wealth is from income cur-
rently being received. We use income streams from pensions, annuities,
and veterans’ beneﬁts. There is no way to distinguish between DC and DB
sources, so we report these data as a separate category (PV pension in-
come) in tables 1.3 and 1.4.
Constructing Pension Wealth
For DC-type pensions the reported balance is our measure of pension
wealth. For persons expecting DB pension beneﬁts and persons currently
receiving pension income, we compute the present value of the beneﬁt
stream using the following assumptions: Mortality data are based on pop-
ulation averages by gender, age, and birth cohort provided by the Social
Security Administration; see Mitchell, Olson, and Steinmeier (2000) for a
discussion of these data. For discounting and earnings growth we use the
“intermediate” interest rate assumptions used by the Social Security Ad-
ministration; see Board of Trustees (1995). Public pensions are assumed to
be fully indexed, again using the “intermediate” projections of the Social
Security Administration; see Board of Trustees (1995). Private-sector pen-
sion beneﬁts are not indexed.
Respondents were asked to provide the expected pension beneﬁts at
their expected dates of retirement. If beneﬁts are not currently being re-
ceived, they are assumed to commence at the expected age of retirement
(the mean is sixty-two). The average age of HRS respondents is ﬁfty-ﬁve.
Thus, for the typical HRS respondent, retirement beneﬁts do not begin for
another seven years. We have assumed that their responses to the expected
pension-beneﬁts question are denominated in future (date of retirement)
dollars. Moreover, we have assumed that the beneﬁt amount is a single-
survivor beneﬁt. Accordingly, we use individual survival probabilities in
the computation of the present value. If we assumed instead that the re-
sponses represented joint-survivor beneﬁts, calculated pension wealth
would be somewhat higher.
We further assume that when respondents report expected pension ben-
eﬁts, they do not anticipate separating from their employers prior to retire-
ment. This assumption allows us to calculate the present value of retire-
ment wealth conditional on continued years of service until retirement.
Thec omponent of this wealth “earned” as of the survey date is this present
value multiplied by the ratio of years of service at the survey date to years
of servicea tthe expected date of retirement. This adjustment is necessary
Choice, Chance, and Wealth Dispersion at Retirement 63to make the present value of DB beneﬁts comparable to the accumulated
balance in a DC plan at the date of the survey.
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